We study cooperation structures with the following property: Given any two feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection, its union is a feasible coalition again. These combinatorial structures have a direct relationship with graph communication situations and conference structures à la Myerson. Characterizations of the Myerson value in this context are provided using the concept of basis for union stable systems. Moreover, TU -games restricted by union stable systems generalizes graph-restricted games and games with permission structures.
Introduction
A transferable utility game or TU-game on a …nite set of players N is a pair (N; v) where v : 2 N ! R is such that v(;) = 0. The elements in N are called players, the subsets S 2 2 N coalitions and v(S) is the worth of the coalition S. For every subset of players S, v(S) represents the maximal monetary gains that these players can achieve when they decide to cooperate and form the coalition S. We will denote by ¡ N the set of all TU -games on N. Cooperative game theory usually focuses on the negotiation process within the grand coalition N of all players. So the central question is how divide the gains of N among the players in a fair and justi…able way such that cooperation between all players will persist. To better allow for a consistent approach the theory does not restrict to the local level of one particular game but more globally tries to analyze and solve classes of TU -games.
A one-point solution concept for TU -games is a function f : ¡ N ! R N which assigns to every TU -game a n-dimensional real vector f (v) 2 R N which represents payo¤s to the players in the sense that each player i 2 N gets a payo¤ of f i (v). One of the most interesting and best-studied solution concepts in cooperative game theory is the Shapley value as introduced by Shapley [11] .
In a TU -game model it is generally assumed that there are no restrictions on cooperation and therefore each subgroup of players can form a coalition. However, in practice this seems to be inappropriate in modelling certain situations where social asymmetries among the players make certain coalitions infeasible. Several models of restricted cooperation have been proposed, among which are those derived from communication situations as introduced by Myerson [6] . In this model, the bilateral communication relations among the players are taken into account and modelled by means of an undirected graph. The feasible coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs. Another type of asymmetry among the players in a TU -game is introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [5] , and van den Brink [4] . In their model, the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a so-called permission structure.
An important aspect in communication situations is the study of the Myerson value [6] and the position value [3] that were de…ned with the aid of the Shapley value of two di¤erent types of communication games. This line of research in communication situations was continued by Owen [9] , Borm, Owen and Tijs [3] and Potters and Reijnierse [10] , among others. However, Myerson in [7] pointed out the need to generalize this model towards restricted cooperation situations which can not be modelled by a graph. This idea has been studied by van den Nouweland, Borm and Tijs [8] and Algaba, Bilbao, Borm and López [1] .
In Algaba et al. [1] it is assumed that if two feasible coalitions have common elements, these ones will act as intermediaries between the two coalitions in order to establish meaningful cooperation in the union of these coalitions. These feasible coalition systems are called union stable systems. This mathematical feature will be essential in our study and it is satis…ed for the feasible coalitions coming from graph communication situations and permission structures. This approach has already been successfully applied to the position value in [1] . The current paper in some sense complements this study by focusing on the Myerson value.
To be self-contained section 2 recalls the main de…nitions on restricted cooperation by means of union stable systems including the crucial driving notion of basis. Section 3 introduces the Myerson value for games restricted by union stable systems and studies in detail some properties of this value. The concept of basis allows to extend the axiomatic characterizations provided for the Myerson value in Myerson [6] in an elegant way. Section 4 deals with some computational aspects of the Myerson value. The paper concludes with some remarks on the relationship among the models of partial cooperation mentioned above and in particular about relations between the Myerson value and position value in union stable systems, hypergraph communication situations and permission structures.
2 Union stable systems De…nition 2.1 Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a …nite set of players and F µ 2 N a system of feasible coalitions. The set system F is called union stable if for all A; B 2 F with A \ B 6 = ; it is satis…ed that A [ B 2 F.
A communication situation is a triple (N; v; E), where (N; v) is a game and (N; E) is a simple graph, i.e., a graph without self-loops and parallel edges. It is easy to see that the set system F, de…ned by F = fS µ N : (S; E(S)) is a connected subgraph of (N; E)g; is union stable. However, a union stable system can not always be modelled by a communication situation. If N = f1; 2; 3g and F = f;; f1g; f2g; Ng then F is union stable and jSj 6 = 2 for every S 2 F. Then F does not coincide with the connected subgraph system of any graph.
Let F be a union stable system and G µ F: We de…ne inductively the families
De…nition 2.2 Let F be a union stable system and let G µ F. We de…ne G by G = G (k) ; where k is the smallest integer such that
For each union stable family F, we are interested in …nding a minimal subset B (F) such that B (F) = F. Let F be a union stable system and G µ F. If G is union stable, there can be feasible coalitions which can be written as the union of two feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection. So, we can consider the following set:
A 6 = G; B 6 = G; A; B 2 G; A \ B 6 = ;g: De…nition 2.3 Let F be a union stable system. The set B (F) = F n D (F) ; is called the basis of F, and the elements of B (F) are called supports of F.
We remark that the basis B (F) is the minimal subset of the union stable system F such that B (F) = F (see Algaba et al. [1] ). De…nition 2.4 Let G µ 2 N be a set system and let S µ N. A set T µ S is called a G-component of S if it is satis…ed that T 2 G and there exists no
Therefore, the G-components of S are the maximal feasible coalitions that belong to G and are contained in S. We denote by C G (S) the collection of the G-components of S.
Proposition 2.1 The set system F µ 2 N is union stable if and only if for any S µ N with C F (S) 6 = ;, the F-components of S are a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of S.
Proof. Let F be union stable. Let C 1 ; C 2 be two di¤erent maximal feasible coalitions of S. If C 1 \ C 2 6 = ;, then C 1 [ C 2 2 F since F is union stable and C 1 [ C 2 µ S. This contradicts the fact that C 1 and C 2 are F-components of S.
Conversely, assume for any S such that C F (S) 6 = ;, that its F-components form a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of S. Suppose that F is not union stable, then there are A; B 2 F; with A \ B 6 = ; and A [ B = 2 F. Hence, there must be an
It is obvious that if F is a union stable system such that fig 2 F ; for all i 2 N, then the F-components of S form a partition of S. We have also the following consequence of the de…nitions. Proposition 2.2 Let F be a union stable system. Let S µ N and consider F S = fF 2 F : F µ Sg : Then, the following conditions are satis…ed:
In order to establish a relation between conference structures à la Myerson and union stable systems, we give the following results. Moreover, the next theorem will be essential in order to prove the uniqueness in the axiomatization of the Myerson value in union stable systems. De…nition 2.5 Let F be a union stable system. The players i; j 2 N, are called connected by C (F) = fB 2 B (F) : jBj¸2g if there exists a sequence of non-unitary supports (B 1 ; : : : ; B k ), such that i 2 B 1 , j 2 B k and if k¸2, B p \ B p+1 6 = ;, for all p = 1; : : : ; k ¡ 1. Theorem 2.3 Let F be a union stable system. Let S 2 F and i; j 2 N, i 6 = j. Then fi; jg µ S if and only if i and j are connected by C (F) with supports contained in S.
Proof. Let fi; jg µ S. If S 2 C (F), it su¢ces to take k = 1 and
with A; B 2 F; and A \ B 6 = ;: If A; B 2 C (F) then we obtain the result. Otherwise, we repeat this decomposition and, proceeding in this manner, we obtain the sequence of supports. The converse is obvious. ¤ Corollary 2.4 Let F be a union stable system and i; j 2 N, i 6 = j. Then i and j are in the same F-component of N if and only if i and j are connected by C (F) :
The Myerson value: properties and axiomatizations
This section deals with a solution concept for games restricted by union stable structures: the Myerson value.
De…nition 3.1 Let (N; v) be a cooperative n-person game in coalitional form and F µ 2 N a union stable system. The
A union stable structure is a triple (N; v; F) where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is the set of players, (N; v) is a game v : 2 N ! R with v(;) = 0; and F is a union stable system. The Shapley value of a game (N; v) is the vector © (N; v) 2 R N de…ned by
where i 2 N; n = jNj and s = jSj :
The Myerson value of a union stable structure (N; v; F) is the Shapley value of the F-restricted game, i.e., ¹ (N; v;
Example. Consider the player set N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and the union stable system given by F = ff1g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f2; 3; 4g ; Ng : Let v : 2 N ! R be the game de…ned by v(S) = jSj ¡ 1; S 6 = ;, and v(;) = 0: Then the basis B (F) = ff1g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f2; 3; 4gg and C (F) = ff1; 2; 3g ; f2; 3; 4gg : In this case, it is clear that
and the Myerson value is ¹ (N; v; F) = 1 12 (5; 13; 13; 5) : We now consider some properties that would be desirable for an allocation rule, and we focus on the study of these properties for the Myerson value. The set of all union stable structures with player set N will be denoted by US N . De…nition 3.3 An allocation rule on US N is a map°: US N ! R N , satisfying:
(1) Component-e¢ciency:
2 F and consider the set C F (N). To each F-component M of N is associated the game u M which is de…ned in the following way
Moreover, for any coalition
Taking it into account we get
and for all R 6 = M by Proposition 2.1 we have that © i (N; u R ) = 0; i 2 M; the above expression implies that So, according to a fair allocation rule all players in a support B lose or gain the same amount if the support B and all coalitions that are obtained by union stability using support B are deleted. We now extend the axiomatization of the Myerson value to union stable structures. 
Given M 2 C F (N), by component-e¢ciency for°1 and°2, we obtain
On the other hand, Theorem 2.3 indicates that for every j; k 2 M, there exists a non-unitary supports sequence (B 1 ; B 2 ; : : : ; B p ); contained in M such that j 2 B 1 , k 2 B p and B i \ B i+1 6 = ;, i = 1; : : : ; p ¡ 1 and using equality (1) we have°1 j (N; v; F) ¡°2 j (N; v; F) = ®; for j 2 B 1 ;and as
Thus, applying Theorem 2.3 and equality (1) recursively for all elements of the sequence (B 1 ; B 2 ; : : : ; B p ) we get°1
Therefore jMj ® = 0; and hence°1 (N; v; F) =°2 (N; v; F).
(b) Next, we show that the Myerson value is fair. Consider the game (N; w) given by w(S) = v F (S)¡v F 0 (S); for all S µ N, where F 0 = B (F) n fBg. Let k 2 B. Note that w(S) = 0; for all S µ N; B " S. Also note that for any S µ N with B µ S, w(S n fkg) = 0 since B " S n fkg. Thus, we can write for k 2 B Proof. Equation (2) implies that is su¢ces to prove that w(S)¸0 for any S µ N such that B µ S, where for all S µ N; w(S) = v F (S) ¡ v F 0 (S); with F 0 = B (F) n fBg. Any maximal feasible coalition of S in F 0 is either a maximal feasible coalition of S in F or it is contained in an F-component of S. Then, taking the F 0 -components of S and taking into consideration that the game (N; v) is superadditive and zero-normalized, we obtain
¤ To provide other axiomatic characterizations for the Myerson value, the next de…nitions are introduced. We use C i (F) to denote the collection given by fC 2 C (F) : i 2 Cg. 
for all S µ N: ¤ We immediately obtain that the Myerson value is additive. Proof. By additivity of°, it su¢ces to show that°¡N; v ¡ v F ; F ¢ = 0, for all (N; v; F) 2 US N . Indeed, for any S µ N,
Thus, all players are super ‡uous for any
Hence, by recursively considering all players in the same component
The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on US N that satis…es additivity, the super ‡uous player property and point anonymity.
Proof. Let°be an allocation rule on US N that also satis…es additivity, the super ‡uous player property and point anonymity. From Lemma 3.6 we deduce°( N; v; F) =°¡N; v F ; F ¢ . The unanimity games fu S : S 2 F, S 6 = ;g form a basis for the vector space of the F-restricted games (see Bilbao [2] ), that is,
for some coe¢cients ® S : Applying additivity, it su¢ces to show that°(N; ®u S ; F), is uniquely determined for all S 2 F; S 6 = ; and ® 2 R. Fix S and ®.
We deduce that any player that is not in S is super ‡uous and hence, by the super ‡uous player property,°(
Since C F S (N) = C F (S) = fSg; component-null property implies that°i (N; ®u S ; F S ) = 0; for all i 2 NnS: It remains only to compute°i (N; ®u S ; F S ) for all i 2 S: First, for all T µ N; we have
It follows that there exists a function f : f0; 1; : : : ; jSjg ! R; such that
and f (jSj) = ®. Hence (N; ®u S ; F S ) is point anonymous and, applying point anonymity to the rule°, there exists¯2 R such that°i
Further, C F S (N) = fSg, and using component-e¢ciency we get X i2S°i (N; ®u S ; F S ) = ® = jSj¯:
Then¯= ®= jSj and we deduce that°(N; v; F) is the Myerson value. ¤
Computational aspects
One of the main problems of the Myerson value is its computation. Some formulas to compute it more easily in this context have been given by Bilbao [2] . In this section we complete this study and show that the Myerson value satis…es the nice formula of Shapley. On the other hand and taking into account that the coalition N may not be feasible, we prove that the calculation of the Myerson value can be simpli…ed and computed by the maximal feasible coalitions of N which each player belongs to. Proof. Taking into account the de…nitions of ¹ i (N; v; F) and the one of restricted game ¡ N; v F ¢ we have
On the other hand, as ¹ i (N; v; F) is an allocation rule, we conclude
¤ Notice that the Shapley-formula coincides with the classical one when the cooperation is total, i.e., if F = 2 N Theorem 4.2 Let (N; v; F) 2 US N . If v is a zero-normalized game and
Taking into account that for every coalition S µ N it is satis…ed
Taking into account the classical formula of the Shapley value, we have X
Fixing a coalition R, the coalitions S µ N, such that S \ M = R, are expressed in the following way 8 > > > > < > > > > :
Setting r = jRj ; m = jMj, it boils down to
Consequently, 3. If T 1 and T 2 are interaction sets of S and satisfying that T 1 \ T 2 6 = ;; then T 1 [ T 2 is an interaction set of S.
Taking into account the above de…nition, it can be assured that hypergraph communication situations give rise to union stable cooperation structures, the feasible coalitions being all interaction sets within arbitrary coalitions. Assuming zero normalization of the underlying game, we may suppose, without loss of generality, that the unitary coalitions belong to the system. So, given a union stable cooperation structure, there are several hypergraph communication situations whose interaction sets coincides with the feasible coalitions of the union stable system. Obviously, one of the hypergraph communication situations is that whose conference set H is formed by the nonunitary supports of the basis.
In fact, considering US N instead of HCS N boils down to considering equivalence classes (respecting interaction sets) which also respect to the Myerson value. Given (N; v; F) 2 US N , where v is zero-normalized, for any player i 2 N, ¹ i (N; v; F) uniquely depends on the feasible coalitions where the player i is. In the same way, given (N; v; H) 2 HCS N , the Myerson value ¹ i (N; v; H) only depends on the interaction sets which the player i belongs to. Therefore, if it is considered (N; v; F) 2 US N the Myerson value ¹ (N; v; F) is the same as the Myerson value ¹ (N; v; H), for every (N; v; H) whose interaction set system coincides with the set of feasible coalitions of F.
Formally, the above ideas could have been used to translate the existing characterizations of the Myerson value on HCS N to US N . In this paper, we have instead chosen for an approach symmetric to the one for the position value [1] for which the same line of reasoning can not be applied. Moreover, in our context a non-unitary support is the precise and natural generalization of an edge of a graph. This concept allows for more transparent proofs and results.
A …nal remark is concerned with so-called permission structure games: games restricted by the feasible coalition system derived from a directed graph using either the conjunctive or disjunctive approach. Gilles et al. [5] and van den Brink [4] showed that the feasible coalition system F derived from the conjunctive or disjunctive approach is closed under taking unions, and hence constitutes a union stable system. This property implies that every coalition S µ N has a unique F-component that corresponds to the sovereign part of S. Then, the F-restricted game is the same as the conjunctive or disjunctive restriction and hence, the conjunctive or disjunctive permission value coincides with the Myerson value ¹ (N; v; F).
The …nal conclusion is that games restricted by union stable systems generalizes graph communication situations and games with permission structures. Therefore, the Shapley value for games restricted by graphs or permission structures is the Myerson value for union stable systems.
